In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: cfg80211: handle 2x996 RU allocation in cfg80211_calculate_bitrate_he()\n\nCurrently NL80211_RATE_INFO_HE_RU_ALLOC_2x996 is not handled in\ncfg80211_calculate_bitrate_he(), leading to below warning:\n\nkernel: invalid HE MCS: bw:6, ru:6\nkernel: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2312 at net/wireless/util.c:1501 cfg80211_calculate_bitrate_he+0x22b/0x270 [cfg80211]\n\nFix it by handling 2x996 RU allocation in the same way as 160 MHz bandwidth.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/nouveau: prime: fix refcount underflow\n\nCalling nouveau_bo_ref() on a nouveau_bo without initializing it (and\nhence the backing ttm_bo) leads to a refcount underflow.\n\nInstead of calling nouveau_bo_ref() in the unwind path of\ndrm_gem_object_init(), clean things up manually.\n\n(cherry picked from commit 1b93f3e89d03cfc576636e195466a0d728ad8de5)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/vmwgfx: Fix a deadlock in dma buf fence polling\n\nIntroduce a version of the fence ops that on release doesn't remove\nthe fence from the pending list, and thus doesn't require a lock to\nfix poll->fence wait->fence unref deadlocks.\n\nvmwgfx overwrites the wait callback to iterate over the list of all\nfences and update their status, to do that it holds a lock to prevent\nthe list modifcations from other threads. The fence destroy callback\nboth deletes the fence and removes it from the list of pending\nfences, for which it holds a lock.\n\ndma buf polling cb unrefs a fence after it's been signaled: so the poll\ncalls the wait, which signals the fences, which are being destroyed.\nThe destruction tries to acquire the lock on the pending fences list\nwhich it can never get because it's held by the wait from which it\nwas called.\n\nOld bug, but not a lot of userspace apps were using dma-buf polling\ninterfaces. Fix those, in particular this fixes KDE stalls/deadlock.

漏洞存在于Linux内核的网络（net）模块下的USB子模块qmi_wwan中，漏洞成因是当非IP数据包到达时，未正确释放skb（sk_buff）内存结构，导致内存泄漏。影响版本4.12<=版本<6.11-rc3，包含4.19和5.10

漏洞存在于Linux内核的网络模块（net），漏洞成因是`__skb_flow_dissect`函数在处理数据包时，使用了不当的调试输出方式，导致在某些情况下产生警告信息。这个警告信息在追踪基础设施中被触发，特别是当`__skb_get_hash()`函数被用于识别追踪中的数据包时，可能会引发问题并导致错误的警告信息频繁出现。修复方案建议使用`DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE`替代原有的调试输出方式，以避免不必要的警告信息，并确保系统的稳定性和性能。影响版本5.2<=版本<6.11-rc1，包含5.10

漏洞存在于Linux内核的kobject模块，漏洞成因是zap_modalias_env函数错误地计算了要移动的内存块大小，如果@env参数中的MODALIAS变量不是最后一个，则会导致越界内存访问问题，修复方法是更正大小以进行memmove操作。影响版本4.15<=版本<6.11-rc1，包含4.19和5.10

漏洞存在于Linux内核的SCSI子系统中的qla2xxx模块，漏洞成因是在卸载过程中遇到了过期的命令数组条目，导致在处理所有这些过时的I/O条目时发出并中断了eh_abort，但在vport删除过程中，I/O无法完成。影响版本版本<6.11-rc1，包含4.19和5.10

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: qla2xxx: Fix for possible memory corruption\n\nInit Control Block is dereferenced incorrectly. Correctly dereference ICB

这个漏洞存在于Linux内核的SCSI子系统中的qla2xxx模块。漏洞成因是qla2xxx模块在处理NVMe远程端口注册时，没有正确验证nvme_local_port，导致在处理失败时发生空指针引用错误，最终引起内核崩溃。修复方案是在qla_nvme_register_remote()函数中增加检查，当qla_nvme_register_hba()函数失败时退出，并正确验证nvme_local_port。影响版本版本<6.11-rc1，包含4.19和5.10

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRDMA/iwcm: Fix a use-after-free related to destroying CM IDs\n\niw_conn_req_handler() associates a new struct rdma_id_private (conn_id) with\nan existing struct iw_cm_id (cm_id) as follows:\n\n conn_id->cm_id.iw = cm_id;\n cm_id->context = conn_id;\n cm_id->cm_handler = cma_iw_handler;\n\nrdma_destroy_id() frees both the cm_id and the struct rdma_id_private. Make\nsure that cm_work_handler() does not trigger a use-after-free by only\nfreeing of the struct rdma_id_private after all pending work has finished.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntipc: Return non-zero value from tipc_udp_addr2str() on error\n\ntipc_udp_addr2str() should return non-zero value if the UDP media\naddress is invalid. Otherwise, a buffer overflow access can occur in\ntipc_media_addr_printf(). Fix this by returning 1 on an invalid UDP\nmedia address.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmISDN: Fix a use after free in hfcmulti_tx()\n\nDon't dereference *sp after calling dev_kfree_skb(*sp).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/iucv: fix use after free in iucv_sock_close()\n\niucv_sever_path() is called from process context and from bh context.\niucv->path is used as indicator whether somebody else is taking care of\nsevering the path (or it is already removed / never existed).\nThis needs to be done with atomic compare and swap, otherwise there is a\nsmall window where iucv_sock_close() will try to work with a path that has\nalready been severed and freed by iucv_callback_connrej() called by\niucv_tasklet_fn().\n\nExample:\n[452744.123844] Call Trace:\n[452744.123845] ([<0000001e87f03880>] 0x1e87f03880)\n[452744.123966] [<00000000d593001e>] iucv_path_sever+0x96/0x138\n[452744.124330] [<000003ff801ddbca>] iucv_sever_path+0xc2/0xd0 [af_iucv]\n[452744.124336] [<000003ff801e01b6>] iucv_sock_close+0xa6/0x310 [af_iucv]\n[452744.124341] [<000003ff801e08cc>] iucv_sock_release+0x3c/0xd0 [af_iucv]\n[452744.124345] [<00000000d574794e>] __sock_release+0x5e/0xe8\n[452744.124815] [<00000000d5747a0c>] sock_close+0x34/0x48\n[452744.124820] [<00000000d5421642>] __fput+0xba/0x268\n[452744.124826] [<00000000d51b382c>] task_work_run+0xbc/0xf0\n[452744.124832] [<00000000d5145710>] do_notify_resume+0x88/0x90\n[452744.124841] [<00000000d5978096>] system_call+0xe2/0x2c8\n[452744.125319] Last Breaking-Event-Address:\n[452744.125321] [<00000000d5930018>] iucv_path_sever+0x90/0x138\n[452744.125324]\n[452744.125325] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt\n\nNote that bh_lock_sock() is not serializing the tasklet context against\nprocess context, because the check for sock_owned_by_user() and\ncorresponding handling is missing.\n\nIdeas for a future clean-up patch:\nA) Correct usage of bh_lock_sock() in tasklet context, as described in\nRe-enqueue, if needed. This may require adding return values to the\ntasklet functions and thus changes to all users of iucv.\n\nB) Change iucv tasklet into worker and use only lock_sock() in af_iucv.

漏洞存在于Linux内核的i915/gem模块，漏洞成因是计算映射区域大小时，取请求大小和实际大小的较小值，未考虑部分映射偏移，可能导致页面故障访问。影响版本4.9<=版本<6.11-rc3，影响4.19和5.10

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\nfirmware: cs_dsp: Return error if block header overflows file\nReturn an error from cs_dsp_power_up() if a block header is longer\nthan the amount of data left in the file.\nThe previous code in cs_dsp_load() and cs_dsp_load_coeff() would loop\nwhile there was enough data left in the file for a valid region. This\nprotected against overrunning the end of the file data, but it didn't\nabort the file processing with an error.

漏洞存在于Linux内核的libceph模块,漏洞成因是处理延迟工作的方法在ceph_monc_stop()函数中容易与mon_fault()和finish_hunting()发生条件竞争。这两个函数都可能导致重新排列延迟的工作时间。影响版本4.19<=版本<6.10，影响4.19盒5.10

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\nfirmware: cs_dsp: Prevent buffer overrun when processing V2 alg headers\nCheck that all fields of a V2 algorithm header fit into the available\nfirmware data buffer.\nThe wmfw V2 format introduced variable-length strings in the algorithm\nblock header. This means the overall header length is variable, and the\nposition of most fields varies depending on the length of the string\nfields. Each field must be checked to ensure that it does not overflow\nthe firmware data buffer.\nAs this ia bugfix patch, the fixes avoid making any significant change to\nthe existing code. This makes it easier to review and less likely to\nintroduce new bugs.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\ncpufreq: amd-pstate: fix memory leak on CPU EPP exit\nThe cpudata memory from kzalloc() in amd_pstate_epp_cpu_init() is\nnot freed in the analogous exit function, so fix that.\n[ rjw: Subject and changelog edits ]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\nnetns: Make get_net_ns() handle zero refcount net\nSyzkaller hit a warning:\nrefcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.\nWARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 7890 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 3 PID: 7890 Comm: tun Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3-00100-gcaa4f9578aba-dirty #310\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0\nCode: 41 49 04 31 ff 89 de e8 9f 1e cd fe 84 db 75 9c e8 76 26 cd fe c6 05 b6 41 49 04 01 90 48 c7 c7 b8 8e 25 86 e8 d2 05 b5 fe 90 <0f> 0b 90 90 e9 79 ff ff ff e8 53 26 cd fe 0f b6 1\nRSP: 0018:ffff8881067b7da0 EFLAGS: 00010286\nRAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff811c72ac\nRDX: ffff8881026a2140 RSI: ffffffff811c72b5 RDI: 0000000000000001\nRBP: ffff8881067b7db0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 205b5d3730353139\nR10: 0000000000000000 R11: 205d303938375420 R12: ffff8881086500c4\nR13: ffff8881086500c4 R14: ffff8881086500b0 R15: ffff888108650040\nFS: 00007f5b2961a4c0(0000) GS:ffff88823bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 000055d7ed36fd18 CR3: 00000001482f6000 CR4: 00000000000006f0\nDR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\nDR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\nCall Trace:\n\n? show_regs+0xa3/0xc0\n? __warn+0xa5/0x1c0\n? refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0\n? report_bug+0x1fc/0x2d0\n? refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0\n? handle_bug+0xa1/0x110\n? exc_invalid_op+0x3c/0xb0\n? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30\n? __warn_printk+0xcc/0x140\n? __warn_printk+0xd5/0x140\n? refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0\nget_net_ns+0xa4/0xc0\n? __pfx_get_net_ns+0x10/0x10\nopen_related_ns+0x5a/0x130\n__tun_chr_ioctl+0x1616/0x2370\n? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x58/0xa0\n? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp2+0x1c/0x30\n? __pfx_tun_chr_ioctl+0x10/0x10\ntun_chr_ioctl+0x2f/0x40\n__x64_sys_ioctl+0x11b/0x160\nx64_sys_call+0x1211/0x20d0\ndo_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1d0\nentry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\nRIP: 0033:0x7f5b28f165d7\nCode: b3 66 90 48 8b 05 b1 48 2d 00 64 c7 00 26 00 00 00 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 81 48 2d 00 8\nRSP: 002b:00007ffc2b59c5e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010\nRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f5b28f165d7\nRDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000054e3 RDI: 0000000000000003\nRBP: 00007ffc2b59c650 R08: 00007f5b291ed8c0 R09: 00007f5b2961a4c0\nR10: 0000000029690010 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400730\nR13: 00007ffc2b59cf40 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000\n\nKernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ...\nThis is trigger as below:\nns0 ns1\ntun_set_iff() //dev is tun0\ntun->dev = dev\n//ip link set tun0 netns ns1\nput_net() //ref is 0\n__tun_chr_ioctl() //TUNGETDEVNETNS\nnet = dev_net(tun->dev);\nopen_related_ns(&net->ns, get_net_ns); //ns1\nget_net_ns()\nget_net() //addition on 0\nUse maybe_get_net() in get_net_ns in case net's ref is zero to fix this

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\nnet: do not leave a dangling sk pointer, when socket creation fails\nIt is possible to trigger a use-after-free by:\n* attaching an fentry probe to __sock_release() and the probe calling the\nbpf_get_socket_cookie() helper\n* running traceroute -I 1.1.1.1 on a freshly booted VM\nA KASAN enabled kernel will log something like below (decoded and stripped):\n==================================================================\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __sock_gen_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:15 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2583 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1611 net/core/sock_diag.c:29)\nRead of size 8 at addr ffff888007110dd8 by task traceroute/299\nCPU: 2 PID: 299 Comm: traceroute Tainted: G E 6.10.0-rc2+ #2\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014\nCall Trace:\n\ndump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:117 (discriminator 1))\nprint_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:488)\n? __sock_gen_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:15 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2583 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1611 net/core/sock_diag.c:29)\nkasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:603)\n? __sock_gen_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:15 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2583 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1611 net/core/sock_diag.c:29)\nkasan_check_range (mm/kasan/generic.c:183 mm/kasan/generic.c:189)\n__sock_gen_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:15 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2583 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1611 net/core/sock_diag.c:29)\nbpf_get_socket_ptr_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:94 ./include/linux/sock_diag.h:42 net/core/filter.c:5094 net/core/filter.c:5092)\nbpf_prog_875642cf11f1d139___sock_release+0x6e/0x8e\nbpf_trampoline_6442506592+0x47/0xaf\n__sock_release (net/socket.c:652)\n__sock_create (net/socket.c:1601)\n...\nAllocated by task 299 on cpu 2 at 78.328492s:\nkasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48)\nkasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:68)\n__kasan_slab_alloc (mm/kasan/common.c:312 mm/kasan/common.c:338)\nkmem_cache_alloc_noprof (mm/slub.c:3941 mm/slub.c:4000 mm/slub.c:4007)\nsk_prot_alloc (net/core/sock.c:2075)\nsk_alloc (net/core/sock.c:2134)\ninet_create (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:327 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:252)\n__sock_create (net/socket.c:1572)\n__sys_socket (net/socket.c:1660 net/socket.c:1644 net/socket.c:1706)\n__x64_sys_socket (net/socket.c:1718)\ndo_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83)\nentry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)\nFreed by task 299 on cpu 2 at 78.328502s:\nkasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48)\nkasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:68)\nkasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:582)\npoison_slab_object (mm/kasan/common.c:242)\n__kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:256)\nkmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:4437 mm/slub.c:4511)\n__sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2117 net/core/sock.c:2208)\ninet_create (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:397 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:252)\n__sock_create (net/socket.c:1572)\n__sys_socket (net/socket.c:1660 net/socket.c:1644 net/socket.c:1706)\n__x64_sys_socket (net/socket.c:1718)\ndo_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83)\nentry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)\nFix this by clearing the struct socket reference in sk_common_release() to cover\nall protocol families create functions, which may already attached the\nreference to the sk object with sock_init_data().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\nvmci: prevent speculation leaks by sanitizing event in event_deliver()\nCoverity spotted that event_msg is controlled by user-space,\nevent_msg->event_data.event is passed to event_deliver() and used\nas an index without sanitization.\nThis change ensures that the event index is sanitized to mitigate any\npossibility of speculative information leaks.\nThis bug was discovered and resolved using Coverity Static Analysis\nSecurity Testing (SAST) by Synopsys, Inc.\nOnly compile tested, no access to HW.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\nVMCI: Fix memcpy() run-time warning in dg_dispatch_as_host()\nSyzkaller hit 'WARNING in dg_dispatch_as_host' bug.\nmemcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 56) of single field "&dg_info->msg"\nat drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_datagram.c:237 (size 24)\nWARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1555 at drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_datagram.c:237\ndg_dispatch_as_host+0x88e/0xa60 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_datagram.c:237\nSome code commentry, based on my understanding:\n544 #define VMCI_DG_SIZE(_dg) (VMCI_DG_HEADERSIZE + (size_t)(_dg)->payload_size)\n/// This is 24 + payload_size\nmemcpy(&dg_info->msg, dg, dg_size);\nDestination = dg_info->msg ---> this is a 24 byte\nstructure(struct vmci_datagram)\nSource = dg --> this is a 24 byte structure (struct vmci_datagram)\nSize = dg_size = 24 + payload_size\n{payload_size = 56-24 =32} -- Syzkaller managed to set payload_size to 32.\n35 struct delayed_datagram_info {\n36 struct datagram_entry *entry;\n37 struct work_struct work;\n38 bool in_dg_host_queue;\n39 /* msg and msg_payload must be together. */\n40 struct vmci_datagram msg;\n41 u8 msg_payload[];\n42 };\nSo those extra bytes of payload are copied into msg_payload[], a run time\nwarning is seen while fuzzing with Syzkaller.\nOne possible way to fix the warning is to split the memcpy() into\ntwo parts -- one -- direct assignment of msg and second taking care of payload.\nGustavo quoted:\n"Under FORTIFY_SOURCE we should not copy data across multiple members\nin a structure."

This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority for the following reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\nphylib: fix potential use-after-free\nCommit bafbdd527d56 ("phylib: Add device reset GPIO support") added call\nto phy_device_reset(phydev) after the put_device() call in phy_detach().\nThe comment before the put_device() call says that the phydev might go\naway with put_device().\nFix potential use-after-free by calling phy_device_reset() before\nput_device().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\nhwmon: (w83791d) Fix NULL pointer dereference by removing unnecessary structure field\nIf driver read val value sufficient for\n(val & 0x08) && (!(val & 0x80)) && ((val & 0x7) == ((val >> 4) & 0x7))\nfrom device then Null pointer dereference occurs.\n(It is possible if tmp = 0b0xyz1xyz, where same literals mean same numbers)\nAlso lm75[] does not serve a purpose anymore after switching to\ndevm_i2c_new_dummy_device() in w83791d_detect_subclients().\nThe patch fixes possible NULL pointer dereference by removing lm75[].\nFound by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org).\n[groeck: Dropped unnecessary continuation lines, fixed multi-line alignment]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\nwatchdog: Fix possible use-after-free by calling del_timer_sync()\nThis driver's remove path calls del_timer(). However, that function\ndoes not wait until the timer handler finishes. This means that the\ntimer handler may still be running after the driver's remove function\nhas finished, which would result in a use-after-free.\nFix by calling del_timer_sync(), which makes sure the timer handler\nhas finished, and unable to re-schedule itself.

Certificate Validation user interface in LibreOffice allows potential vulnerability.\nSigned macros are scripts that have been digitally signed by the \ndeveloper using a cryptographic signature. When a document with a signed\nmacro is opened a warning is displayed by LibreOffice before the macro \nis executed.\nPreviously if verification failed the user could fail to understand the failure and choose to enable the macros anyway.\nThis issue affects LibreOffice: from 24.2 before 24.2.5.

In Emacs before 29.4, org-link-expand-abbrev in lisp/ol.el expands a %(...) link abbrev even when it specifies an unsafe function, such as shell-command-to-string. This affects Org Mode before 9.7.5.

Unchecked script execution in Graphic on-click binding in affected LibreOffice versions allows an attacker to create a document which without prompt will execute scripts built-into LibreOffice on clicking a graphic. Such scripts were previously deemed trusted but are now deemed untrusted.

A use-after-free vulnerability was found in OpenSSL. Calling the OpenSSL API SSL_free_buffers function may cause memory to be accessed that was previously freed in some situations.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndevres: Fix memory leakage caused by driver API devm_free_percpu()\n\nIt will cause memory leakage when use driver API devm_free_percpu()\nto free memory allocated by devm_alloc_percpu(), fixed by using\ndevres_release() instead of devres_destroy() within devm_free_percpu().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nleds: trigger: Unregister sysfs attributes before calling deactivate()\n\nTriggers which have trigger specific sysfs attributes typically store\nrelated data in trigger-data allocated by the activate() callback and\nfreed by the deactivate() callback.\n\nCalling device_remove_groups() after calling deactivate() leaves a window\nwhere the sysfs attributes show/store functions could be called after\ndeactivation and then operate on the just freed trigger-data.\n\nMove the device_remove_groups() call to before deactivate() to close\nthis race window.\n\nThis also makes the deactivation path properly do things in reverse order\nof the activation path which calls the activate() callback before calling\ndevice_add_groups().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipvs: properly dereference pe in ip_vs_add_service\n\nUse pe directly to resolve sparse warning:\n\n net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:1471:27: warning: dereference of noderef expression

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nprotect the fetch of ->fd[fd] in do_dup2() from mispredictions\n\nboth callers have verified that fd is not greater than ->max_fds;\nhowever, misprediction might end up with\n tofree = fdt->fd[fd];\nbeing speculatively executed. That's wrong for the same reasons\nwhy it's wrong in close_fd()/file_close_fd_locked(); the same\nsolution applies - array_index_nospec(fd, fdt->max_fds) could differ\nfrom fd only in case of speculative execution on mispredicted path.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet, sunrpc: Remap EPERM in case of connection failure in xs_tcp_setup_socket\n\nWhen using a BPF program on kernel_connect(), the call can return -EPERM. This\ncauses xs_tcp_setup_socket() to loop forever, filling up the syslog and causing\nthe kernel to potentially freeze up.\n\nNeil suggested:\n\n This will propagate -EPERM up into other layers which might not be ready\n to handle it. It might be safer to map EPERM to an error we would be more\n likely to expect from the network system - such as ECONNREFUSED or ENETDOWN.\n\nECONNREFUSED as error seems reasonable. For programs setting a different error\ncan be out of reach (see handling in 4fbac77d2d09) in particular on kernels\nwhich do not have f10d05966196 ("bpf: Make BPF_PROG_RUN_ARRAY return -err\ninstead of allow boolean"), thus given that it is better to simply remap for\nconsistent behavior. UDP does handle EPERM in xs_udp_send_request().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nx86/bhi: Avoid warning in #DB handler due to BHI mitigation\n\nWhen BHI mitigation is enabled, if SYSENTER is invoked with the TF flag set\nthen entry_SYSENTER_compat() uses CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY and calls the\nclear_bhb_loop() before the TF flag is cleared. This causes the #DB handler\n(exc_debug_kernel()) to issue a warning because single-step is used outside the\nentry_SYSENTER_compat() function.\n\nTo address this issue, entry_SYSENTER_compat() should use CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY\nafter making sure the TF flag is cleared.\n\nThe problem can be reproduced with the following sequence:\n\n $ cat sysenter_step.c\n int main()\n { asm("pushf; pop %ax; bts $8,%ax; push %ax; popf; sysenter"); }\n\n $ gcc -o sysenter_step sysenter_step.c\n\n $ ./sysenter_step\n Segmentation fault (core dumped)\n\nThe program is expected to crash, and the #DB handler will issue a warning.\n\nKernel log:\n\n WARNING: CPU: 27 PID: 7000 at arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1009 exc_debug_kernel+0xd2/0x160\n ...\n RIP: 0010:exc_debug_kernel+0xd2/0x160\n ...\n Call Trace:\n <#DB>\n ? show_regs+0x68/0x80\n ? __warn+0x8c/0x140\n ? exc_debug_kernel+0xd2/0x160\n ? report_bug+0x175/0x1a0\n ? handle_bug+0x44/0x90\n ? exc_invalid_op+0x1c/0x70\n ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30\n ? exc_debug_kernel+0xd2/0x160\n exc_debug+0x43/0x50\n asm_exc_debug+0x1e/0x40\n RIP: 0010:clear_bhb_loop+0x0/0xb0\n ...\n </#DB>\n <TASK>\n ? entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x8d\n </TASK>\n\n [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfirmware: cs_dsp: Validate payload length before processing block\n\nMove the payload length check in cs_dsp_load() and cs_dsp_coeff_load()\nto be done before the block is processed.\n\nThe check that the length of a block payload does not exceed the number\nof remaining bytes in the firwmware file buffer was being done near the\nend of the loop iteration. However, some code before that check used the\nlength field without validating it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amdgpu: Using uninitialized value *size when calling amdgpu_vce_cs_reloc\n\nInitialize the size before calling amdgpu_vce_cs_reloc, such as case 0x03000001.\nV2: To really improve the handling we would actually\n need to have a separate value of 0xffffffff.(Christian)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: xhci: prevent potential failure in handle_tx_event() for Transfer events without TRB\n\nSome transfer events don't always point to a TRB, and consequently don't\nhave a endpoint ring. In these cases, function handle_tx_event() should\nnot proceed, because if 'ep->skip' is set, the pointer to the endpoint\nring is used.\n\nTo prevent a potential failure and make the code logical, return after\nchecking the completion code for a Transfer event without TRBs.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: mt76: replace skb_put with skb_put_zero\n\nAvoid potentially reusing uninitialized data

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntcp_metrics: validate source addr length\n\nI don't see anything checking that TCP_METRICS_ATTR_SADDR_IPV4\nis at least 4 bytes long, and the policy doesn't have an entry\nfor this attribute at all (neither does it for IPv6 but v6 is\nmanually validated).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnvmet: fix a possible leak when destroy a ctrl during qp establishment\n\nIn nvmet_sq_destroy we capture sq->ctrl early and if it is non-NULL we\nknow that a ctrl was allocated (in the admin connect request handler)\nand we need to release pending AERs, clear ctrl->sqs and sq->ctrl\n(for nvme-loop primarily), and drop the final reference on the ctrl.\n\nHowever, a small window is possible where nvmet_sq_destroy starts (as\na result of the client giving up and disconnecting) concurrently with\nthe nvme admin connect cmd (which may be in an early stage). But *before*\nkill_and_confirm of sq->ref (i.e. the admin connect managed to get an sq\nlive reference). In this case, sq->ctrl was allocated however after it was\ncaptured in a local variable in nvmet_sq_destroy.\nThis prevented the final reference drop on the ctrl.\n\nSolve this by re-capturing the sq->ctrl after all inflight request has\ncompleted, where for sure sq->ctrl reference is final, and move forward\nbased on that.\n\nThis issue was observed in an environment with many hosts connecting\nmultiple ctrls simoutanuosly, creating a delay in allocating a ctrl\nleading up to this race window.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm: avoid overflows in dirty throttling logic\n\nThe dirty throttling logic is interspersed with assumptions that dirty\nlimits in PAGE_SIZE units fit into 32-bit (so that various multiplications\nfit into 64-bits). If limits end up being larger, we will hit overflows,\npossible divisions by 0 etc. Fix these problems by never allowing so\nlarge dirty limits as they have dubious practical value anyway. For\ndirty_bytes / dirty_background_bytes interfaces we can just refuse to set\nso large limits. For dirty_ratio / dirty_background_ratio it isn't so\nsimple as the dirty limit is computed from the amount of available memory\nwhich can change due to memory hotplug etc. So when converting dirty\nlimits from ratios to numbers of pages, we just don't allow the result to\nexceed UINT_MAX.\n\nThis is root-only triggerable problem which occurs when the operator\nsets dirty limits to >16 TB.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: qedf: Make qedf_execute_tmf() non-preemptible\n\nStop calling smp_processor_id() from preemptible code in\nqedf_execute_tmf90. This results in BUG_ON() when running an RT kernel.\n\n[ 659.343280] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: sg_reset/3646\n[ 659.343282] caller is qedf_execute_tmf+0x8b/0x360 [qedf]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: cfg80211: restrict NL80211_ATTR_TXQ_QUANTUM values\n\nsyzbot is able to trigger softlockups, setting NL80211_ATTR_TXQ_QUANTUM\nto 2^31.\n\nWe had a similar issue in sch_fq, fixed with commit\nd9e15a273306 ("pkt_sched: fq: do not accept silly TCA_FQ_QUANTUM")\n\nwatchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 26s! [kworker/1:0:24]\nModules linked in:\nirq event stamp: 131135\n hardirqs last enabled at (131134): [<ffff80008ae8778c>] __exit_to_kernel_mode arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:85 [inline]\n hardirqs last enabled at (131134): [<ffff80008ae8778c>] exit_to_kernel_mode+0xdc/0x10c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:95\n hardirqs last disabled at (131135): [<ffff80008ae85378>] __el1_irq arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:533 [inline]\n hardirqs last disabled at (131135): [<ffff80008ae85378>] el1_interrupt+0x24/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:551\n softirqs last enabled at (125892): [<ffff80008907e82c>] neigh_hh_init net/core/neighbour.c:1538 [inline]\n softirqs last enabled at (125892): [<ffff80008907e82c>] neigh_resolve_output+0x268/0x658 net/core/neighbour.c:1553\n softirqs last disabled at (125896): [<ffff80008904166c>] local_bh_disable+0x10/0x34 include/linux/bottom_half.h:19\nCPU: 1 PID: 24 Comm: kworker/1:0 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-gfda5695d692c #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024\nWorkqueue: mld mld_ifc_work\npstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\n pc : __list_del include/linux/list.h:195 [inline]\n pc : __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:218 [inline]\n pc : list_move_tail include/linux/list.h:310 [inline]\n pc : fq_tin_dequeue include/net/fq_impl.h:112 [inline]\n pc : ieee80211_tx_dequeue+0x6b8/0x3b4c net/mac80211/tx.c:3854\n lr : __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:218 [inline]\n lr : list_move_tail include/linux/list.h:310 [inline]\n lr : fq_tin_dequeue include/net/fq_impl.h:112 [inline]\n lr : ieee80211_tx_dequeue+0x67c/0x3b4c net/mac80211/tx.c:3854\nsp : ffff800093d36700\nx29: ffff800093d36a60 x28: ffff800093d36960 x27: dfff800000000000\nx26: ffff0000d800ad50 x25: ffff0000d800abe0 x24: ffff0000d800abf0\nx23: ffff0000e0032468 x22: ffff0000e00324d4 x21: ffff0000d800abf0\nx20: ffff0000d800abf8 x19: ffff0000d800abf0 x18: ffff800093d363c0\nx17: 000000000000d476 x16: ffff8000805519dc x15: ffff7000127a6cc8\nx14: 1ffff000127a6cc8 x13: 0000000000000004 x12: ffffffffffffffff\nx11: ffff7000127a6cc8 x10: 0000000000ff0100 x9 : 0000000000000000\nx8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000\nx5 : ffff80009287aa08 x4 : 0000000000000008 x3 : ffff80008034c7fc\nx2 : ffff0000e0032468 x1 : 00000000da0e46b8 x0 : ffff0000e0032470\nCall trace:\n __list_del include/linux/list.h:195 [inline]\n __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:218 [inline]\n list_move_tail include/linux/list.h:310 [inline]\n fq_tin_dequeue include/net/fq_impl.h:112 [inline]\n ieee80211_tx_dequeue+0x6b8/0x3b4c net/mac80211/tx.c:3854\n wake_tx_push_queue net/mac80211/util.c:294 [inline]\n ieee80211_handle_wake_tx_queue+0x118/0x274 net/mac80211/util.c:315\n drv_wake_tx_queue net/mac80211/driver-ops.h:1350 [inline]\n schedule_and_wake_txq net/mac80211/driver-ops.h:1357 [inline]\n ieee80211_queue_skb+0x18e8/0x2244 net/mac80211/tx.c:1664\n ieee80211_tx+0x260/0x400 net/mac80211/tx.c:1966\n ieee80211_xmit+0x278/0x354 net/mac80211/tx.c:2062\n __ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0xab8/0x122c net/mac80211/tx.c:4338\n ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0xe0/0x438 net/mac80211/tx.c:4532\n __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4903 [inline]\n netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4917 [inline]\n xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3531 [inline]\n dev_hard_start_xmit+0x27c/0x938 net/core/dev.c:3547\n __dev_queue_xmit+0x1678/0x33fc net/core/dev.c:4341\n dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3091 [inline]\n neigh_resolve_output+0x558/0x658 net/core/neighbour.c:1563\n neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:542 [inline]\n ip6_finish_output2+0x104c/0x1ee8 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:137\n ip6_finish_output+0x428/0x7a0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:222\n NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline]\n ip6_output+0x270/0x594 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:243\n dst_output include/net/dst.h:450 [inline]\n NF_HOOK+0x160/0x4f0 include/linux/netfilter.h:314\n mld_sendpack+0x7b4/0x10f4 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1818\n mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2119 [inline]\n mld_ifc_work+0x840/0xd0c net/ipv6/mcast.c:2650\n process_one_work+0x7b8/0x15d4 kernel/workqueue.c:3267\n process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3348 [inline]\n worker_thread+0x938/0xef4 kernel/workqueue.c:3429\n kthread+0x288/0x310 kernel/kthread.c:388\n ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:860

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nx86: stop playing stack games in profile_pc()\n\nThe 'profile_pc()' function is used for timer-based profiling, which\nisn't really all that relevant any more to begin with, but it also ends\nup making assumptions based on the stack layout that aren't necessarily\nvalid.\n\nBasically, the code tries to account the time spent in spinlocks to the\ncaller rather than the spinlock, and while I support that as a concept,\nit's not worth the code complexity or the KASAN warnings when no serious\nprofiling is done using timers anyway these days.\n\nAnd the code really does depend on stack layout that is only true in the\nsimplest of cases. We've lost the comment at some point (I think when\nthe 32-bit and 64-bit code was unified), but it used to say:\n\n Assume the lock function has either no stack frame or a copy\n of eflags from PUSHF.\n\nwhich explains why it just blindly loads a word or two straight off the\nstack pointer and then takes a minimal look at the values to just check\nif they might be eflags or the return pc:\n\n Eflags always has bits 22 and up cleared unlike kernel addresses\n\nbut that basic stack layout assumption assumes that there isn't any lock\ndebugging etc going on that would complicate the code and cause a stack\nframe.\n\nIt causes KASAN unhappiness reported for years by syzkaller [1] and\nothers [2].\n\nWith no real practical reason for this any more, just remove the code.\n\nJust for historical interest, here's some background commits relating to\nthis code from 2006:\n\n 0cb91a229364 ("i386: Account spinlocks to the caller during profiling for !FP kernels")\n 31679f38d886 ("Simplify profile_pc on x86-64")\n\nand a code unification from 2009:\n\n ef4512882dbe ("x86: time_32/64.c unify profile_pc")\n\nbut the basics of this thing actually goes back to before the git tree.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/iucv: Avoid explicit cpumask var allocation on stack\n\nFor CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK=y kernel, explicit allocation of cpumask\nvariable on stack is not recommended since it can cause potential stack\noverflow.\n\nInstead, kernel code should always use *cpumask_var API(s) to allocate\ncpumask var in config-neutral way, leaving allocation strategy to\nCONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK.\n\nUse *cpumask_var API(s) to address it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\npinctrl: fix deadlock in create_pinctrl() when handling -EPROBE_DEFER\n\nIn create_pinctrl(), pinctrl_maps_mutex is acquired before calling\nadd_setting(). If add_setting() returns -EPROBE_DEFER, create_pinctrl()\ncalls pinctrl_free(). However, pinctrl_free() attempts to acquire\npinctrl_maps_mutex, which is already held by create_pinctrl(), leading to\na potential deadlock.\n\nThis patch resolves the issue by releasing pinctrl_maps_mutex before\ncalling pinctrl_free(), preventing the deadlock.\n\nThis bug was discovered and resolved using Coverity Static Analysis\nSecurity Testing (SAST) by Synopsys, Inc.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nftruncate: pass a signed offset\n\nThe old ftruncate() syscall, using the 32-bit off_t misses a sign\nextension when called in compat mode on 64-bit architectures. As a\nresult, passing a negative length accidentally succeeds in truncating\nto file size between 2GiB and 4GiB.\n\nChanging the type of the compat syscall to the signed compat_off_t\nchanges the behavior so it instead returns -EINVAL.\n\nThe native entry point, the truncate() syscall and the corresponding\nloff_t based variants are all correct already and do not suffer\nfrom this mistake.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: atm: cxacru: fix endpoint checking in cxacru_bind()\n\nSyzbot is still reporting quite an old issue [1] that occurs due to\nincomplete checking of present usb endpoints. As such, wrong\nendpoints types may be used at urb sumbitting stage which in turn\ntriggers a warning in usb_submit_urb().\n\nFix the issue by verifying that required endpoint types are present\nfor both in and out endpoints, taking into account cmd endpoint type.\n\nUnfortunately, this patch has not been tested on real hardware.\n\n[1] Syzbot report:\nusb 1-1: BOGUS urb xfer, pipe 1 != type 3\nWARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8667 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:502 usb_submit_urb+0xed2/0x18a0 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:502\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 0 PID: 8667 Comm: kworker/0:4 Not tainted 5.14.0-rc4-syzkaller #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011\nWorkqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event\nRIP: 0010:usb_submit_urb+0xed2/0x18a0 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:502\n...\nCall Trace:\n cxacru_cm+0x3c0/0x8e0 drivers/usb/atm/cxacru.c:649\n cxacru_card_status+0x22/0xd0 drivers/usb/atm/cxacru.c:760\n cxacru_bind+0x7ac/0x11a0 drivers/usb/atm/cxacru.c:1209\n usbatm_usb_probe+0x321/0x1ae0 drivers/usb/atm/usbatm.c:1055\n cxacru_usb_probe+0xdf/0x1e0 drivers/usb/atm/cxacru.c:1363\n usb_probe_interface+0x315/0x7f0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:396\n call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:517 [inline]\n really_probe+0x23c/0xcd0 drivers/base/dd.c:595\n __driver_probe_device+0x338/0x4d0 drivers/base/dd.c:747\n driver_probe_device+0x4c/0x1a0 drivers/base/dd.c:777\n __device_attach_driver+0x20b/0x2f0 drivers/base/dd.c:894\n bus_for_each_drv+0x15f/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:427\n __device_attach+0x228/0x4a0 drivers/base/dd.c:965\n bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:487\n device_add+0xc2f/0x2180 drivers/base/core.c:3354\n usb_set_configuration+0x113a/0x1910 drivers/usb/core/message.c:2170\n usb_generic_driver_probe+0xba/0x100 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:238\n usb_probe_device+0xd9/0x2c0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:293

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nNFSv4: Fix memory leak in nfs4_set_security_label\n\nWe leak nfs_fattr and nfs4_label every time we set a security xattr.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: mac80211: Avoid address calculations via out of bounds array indexing\n\nreq->n_channels must be set before req->channels[] can be used.\n\nThis patch fixes one of the issues encountered in [1].\n\n[ 83.964255] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/mac80211/scan.c:364:4\n[ 83.964258] index 0 is out of range for type 'struct ieee80211_channel *[]'\n[...]\n[ 83.964264] Call Trace:\n[ 83.964267] <TASK>\n[ 83.964269] dump_stack_lvl+0x3f/0xc0\n[ 83.964274] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xec/0x110\n[ 83.964278] ieee80211_prep_hw_scan+0x2db/0x4b0\n[ 83.964281] __ieee80211_start_scan+0x601/0x990\n[ 83.964291] nl80211_trigger_scan+0x874/0x980\n[ 83.964295] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe8/0x160\n[ 83.964298] genl_rcv_msg+0x240/0x270\n[...]\n\n[1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218810

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\npowerpc/pseries: Whitelist dtl slub object for copying to userspace\n\nReading the dispatch trace log from /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/dtl/cpu-*\nresults in a BUG() when the config CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled as\nshown below.\n\n kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!\n Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]\n LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries\n Modules linked in: xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvfc\n scsi_transport_fc ibmveth pseries_wdt dm_multipath dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse\n CPU: 27 PID: 1815 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3 #85\n Hardware name: IBM,9040-MRX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NM1060_042) hv:phyp pSeries\n NIP: c0000000005d23d4 LR: c0000000005d23d0 CTR: 00000000006ee6f8\n REGS: c000000120c078c0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (6.10.0-rc3)\n MSR: 8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 2828220f XER: 0000000e\n CFAR: c0000000001fdc80 IRQMASK: 0\n [ ... GPRs omitted ... ]\n NIP [c0000000005d23d4] usercopy_abort+0x78/0xb0\n LR [c0000000005d23d0] usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0\n Call Trace:\n usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 (unreliable)\n __check_heap_object+0xf8/0x120\n check_heap_object+0x218/0x240\n __check_object_size+0x84/0x1a4\n dtl_file_read+0x17c/0x2c4\n full_proxy_read+0x8c/0x110\n vfs_read+0xdc/0x3a0\n ksys_read+0x84/0x144\n system_call_exception+0x124/0x330\n system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec\n --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fff81f3ab34\n\nCommit 6d07d1cd300f ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0")\nrequires that only whitelisted areas in slab/slub objects can be copied to\nuserspace when usercopy hardening is enabled using CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.\nDtl contains hypervisor dispatch events which are expected to be read by\nprivileged users. Hence mark this safe for user access.\nSpecify useroffset=0 and usersize=DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES to whitelist the\nentire object.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\npowerpc/eeh: avoid possible crash when edev->pdev changes\n\nIf a PCI device is removed during eeh_pe_report_edev(), edev->pdev\nwill change and can cause a crash, hold the PCI rescan/remove lock\nwhile taking a copy of edev->pdev->bus.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/radeon: check bo_va->bo is non-NULL before using it\n\nThe call to radeon_vm_clear_freed might clear bo_va->bo, so\nwe have to check it before dereferencing it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfirmware: cs_dsp: Use strnlen() on name fields in V1 wmfw files\n\nUse strnlen() instead of strlen() on the algorithm and coefficient name\nstring arrays in V1 wmfw files.\n\nIn V1 wmfw files the name is a NUL-terminated string in a fixed-size\narray. cs_dsp should protect against overrunning the array if the NUL\nterminator is missing.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm: prevent derefencing NULL ptr in pfn_section_valid()\n\nCommit 5ec8e8ea8b77 ("mm/sparsemem: fix race in accessing\nmemory_section->usage") changed pfn_section_valid() to add a READ_ONCE()\ncall around "ms->usage" to fix a race with section_deactivate() where\nms->usage can be cleared. The READ_ONCE() call, by itself, is not enough\nto prevent NULL pointer dereference. We need to check its value before\ndereferencing it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nppp: reject claimed-as-LCP but actually malformed packets\n\nSince 'ppp_async_encode()' assumes valid LCP packets (with code\nfrom 1 to 7 inclusive), add 'ppp_check_packet()' to ensure that\nLCP packet has an actual body beyond PPP_LCP header bytes, and\nreject claimed-as-LCP but actually malformed data otherwise.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfirmware: cs_dsp: Fix overflow checking of wmfw header\n\nFix the checking that firmware file buffer is large enough for the\nwmfw header, to prevent overrunning the buffer.\n\nThe original code tested that the firmware data buffer contained\nenough bytes for the sums of the size of the structs\n\n wmfw_header + wmfw_adsp1_sizes + wmfw_footer\n\nBut wmfw_adsp1_sizes is only used on ADSP1 firmware. For ADSP2 and\nHalo Core the equivalent struct is wmfw_adsp2_sizes, which is\n4 bytes longer. So the length check didn't guarantee that there\nare enough bytes in the firmware buffer for a header with\nwmfw_adsp2_sizes.\n\nThis patch splits the length check into three separate parts. Each\nof the wmfw_header, wmfw_adsp?_sizes and wmfw_footer are checked\nseparately before they are used.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nUSB: core: Fix duplicate endpoint bug by clearing reserved bits in the descriptor\n\nSyzbot has identified a bug in usbcore (see the Closes: tag below)\ncaused by our assumption that the reserved bits in an endpoint\ndescriptor's bEndpointAddress field will always be 0. As a result of\nthe bug, the endpoint_is_duplicate() routine in config.c (and possibly\nother routines as well) may believe that two descriptors are for\ndistinct endpoints, even though they have the same direction and\nendpoint number. This can lead to confusion, including the bug\nidentified by syzbot (two descriptors with matching endpoint numbers\nand directions, where one was interrupt and the other was bulk).\n\nTo fix the bug, we will clear the reserved bits in bEndpointAddress\nwhen we parse the descriptor. (Note that both the USB-2.0 and USB-3.1\nspecs say these bits are "Reserved, reset to zero".) This requires us\nto make a copy of the descriptor earlier in usb_parse_endpoint() and\nuse the copy instead of the original when checking for duplicates.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsched/deadline: Fix task_struct reference leak\n\nDuring the execution of the following stress test with linux-rt:\n\nstress-ng --cyclic 30 --timeout 30 --minimize --quiet\n\nkmemleak frequently reported a memory leak concerning the task_struct:\n\nunreferenced object 0xffff8881305b8000 (size 16136):\n comm "stress-ng", pid 614, jiffies 4294883961 (age 286.412s)\n object hex dump (first 32 bytes):\n 02 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .@..............\n 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................\n debug hex dump (first 16 bytes):\n 53 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 S...............\n backtrace:\n [<00000000046b6790>] dup_task_struct+0x30/0x540\n [<00000000c5ca0f0b>] copy_process+0x3d9/0x50e0\n [<00000000ced59777>] kernel_clone+0xb0/0x770\n [<00000000a50befdc>] __do_sys_clone+0xb6/0xf0\n [<000000001dbf2008>] do_syscall_64+0x5d/0xf0\n [<00000000552900ff>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76\n\nThe issue occurs in start_dl_timer(), which increments the task_struct\nreference count and sets a timer. The timer callback, dl_task_timer,\nis supposed to decrement the reference count upon expiration. However,\nif enqueue_task_dl() is called before the timer expires and cancels it,\nthe reference count is not decremented, leading to the leak.\n\nThis patch fixes the reference leak by ensuring the task_struct\nreference count is properly decremented when the timer is canceled.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxfs: add bounds checking to xlog_recover_process_data\n\nThere is a lack of verification of the space occupied by fixed members\nof xlog_op_header in the xlog_recover_process_data.\n\nWe can create a crafted image to trigger an out of bounds read by\nfollowing these steps:\n 1) Mount an image of xfs, and do some file operations to leave records\n 2) Before umounting, copy the image for subsequent steps to simulate\n abnormal exit. Because umount will ensure that tail_blk and\n head_blk are the same, which will result in the inability to enter\n xlog_recover_process_data\n 3) Write a tool to parse and modify the copied image in step 2\n 4) Make the end of the xlog_op_header entries only 1 byte away from\n xlog_rec_header->h_size\n 5) xlog_rec_header->h_num_logops++\n 6) Modify xlog_rec_header->h_crc\n\nFix:\nAdd a check to make sure there is sufficient space to access fixed members\nof xlog_op_header.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxfs: don't walk off the end of a directory data block\n\nThis adds sanity checks for xfs_dir2_data_unused and xfs_dir2_data_entry\nto make sure don't stray beyond valid memory region. Before patching, the\nloop simply checks that the start offset of the dup and dep is within the\nrange. So in a crafted image, if last entry is xfs_dir2_data_unused, we\ncan change dup->length to dup->length-1 and leave 1 byte of space. In the\nnext traversal, this space will be considered as dup or dep. We may\nencounter an out of bound read when accessing the fixed members.\n\nIn the patch, we make sure that the remaining bytes large enough to hold\nan unused entry before accessing xfs_dir2_data_unused and\nxfs_dir2_data_unused is XFS_DIR2_DATA_ALIGN byte aligned. We also make\nsure that the remaining bytes large enough to hold a dirent with a\nsingle-byte name before accessing xfs_dir2_data_entry.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfilelock: Remove locks reliably when fcntl/close race is detected\n\nWhen fcntl_setlk() races with close(), it removes the created lock with\ndo_lock_file_wait().\nHowever, LSMs can allow the first do_lock_file_wait() that created the lock\nwhile denying the second do_lock_file_wait() that tries to remove the lock.\nSeparately, posix_lock_file() could also fail to\nremove a lock due to GFP_KERNEL allocation failure (when splitting a range\nin the middle).\n\nAfter the bug has been triggered, use-after-free reads will occur in\nlock_get_status() when userspace reads /proc/locks. This can likely be used\nto read arbitrary kernel memory, but can't corrupt kernel memory.\n\nFix it by calling locks_remove_posix() instead, which is designed to\nreliably get rid of POSIX locks associated with the given file and\nfiles_struct and is also used by filp_flush().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntcp: avoid too many retransmit packets\n\nIf a TCP socket is using TCP_USER_TIMEOUT, and the other peer\nretracted its window to zero, tcp_retransmit_timer() can\nretransmit a packet every two jiffies (2 ms for HZ=1000),\nfor about 4 minutes after TCP_USER_TIMEOUT has 'expired'.\n\nThe fix is to make sure tcp_rtx_probe0_timed_out() takes\nicsk->icsk_user_timeout into account.\n\nBefore blamed commit, the socket would not timeout after\nicsk->icsk_user_timeout, but would use standard exponential\nbackoff for the retransmits.\n\nAlso worth noting that before commit e89688e3e978 ("net: tcp:\nfix unexcepted socket die when snd_wnd is 0"), the issue\nwould last 2 minutes instead of 4.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetpoll: Fix race condition in netpoll_owner_active\n\nKCSAN detected a race condition in netpoll:\n\n BUG: KCSAN: data-race in net_rx_action / netpoll_send_skb\n write (marked) to 0xffff8881164168b0 of 4 bytes by interrupt on cpu 10:\n net_rx_action (./include/linux/netpoll.h:90 net/core/dev.c:6712 net/core/dev.c:6822)\n<snip>\n read to 0xffff8881164168b0 of 4 bytes by task 1 on cpu 2:\n netpoll_send_skb (net/core/netpoll.c:319 net/core/netpoll.c:345 net/core/netpoll.c:393)\n netpoll_send_udp (net/core/netpoll.c:?)\n<snip>\n value changed: 0x0000000a -> 0xffffffff\n\nThis happens because netpoll_owner_active() needs to check if the\ncurrent CPU is the owner of the lock, touching napi->poll_owner\nnon atomically. The ->poll_owner field contains the current CPU holding\nthe lock.\n\nUse an atomic read to check if the poll owner is the current CPU.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\next4: fix uninitialized ratelimit_state->lock access in __ext4_fill_super()\n\nIn the following concurrency we will access the uninitialized rs->lock:\n\next4_fill_super\n ext4_register_sysfs\n // sysfs registered msg_ratelimit_interval_ms\n // Other processes modify rs->interval to\n // non-zero via msg_ratelimit_interval_ms\n ext4_orphan_cleanup\n ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "Errors on filesystem, "\n __ext4_msg\n ___ratelimit(&(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_msg_ratelimit_state)\n if (!rs->interval) // do nothing if interval is 0\n return 1;\n raw_spin_trylock_irqsave(&rs->lock, flags)\n raw_spin_trylock(lock)\n _raw_spin_trylock\n __raw_spin_trylock\n spin_acquire(&lock->dep_map, 0, 1, _RET_IP_)\n lock_acquire\n __lock_acquire\n register_lock_class\n assign_lock_key\n dump_stack();\n ratelimit_state_init(&sbi->s_msg_ratelimit_state, 5 * HZ, 10);\n raw_spin_lock_init(&rs->lock);\n // init rs->lock here\n\nand get the following dump_stack:\n\n=========================================================\nINFO: trying to register non-static key.\nThe code is fine but needs lockdep annotation, or maybe\nyou didn't initialize this object before use?\nturning off the locking correctness validator.\nCPU: 12 PID: 753 Comm: mount Tainted: G E 6.7.0-rc6-next-20231222 #504\n[...]\nCall Trace:\n dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x170\n dump_stack+0x18/0x30\n register_lock_class+0x740/0x7c0\n __lock_acquire+0x69/0x13a0\n lock_acquire+0x120/0x450\n _raw_spin_trylock+0x98/0xd0\n ___ratelimit+0xf6/0x220\n __ext4_msg+0x7f/0x160 [ext4]\n ext4_orphan_cleanup+0x665/0x740 [ext4]\n __ext4_fill_super+0x21ea/0x2b10 [ext4]\n ext4_fill_super+0x14d/0x360 [ext4]\n[...]\n=========================================================\n\nNormally interval is 0 until s_msg_ratelimit_state is initialized, so\n___ratelimit() does nothing. But registering sysfs precedes initializing\nrs->lock, so it is possible to change rs->interval to a non-zero value\nvia the msg_ratelimit_interval_ms interface of sysfs while rs->lock is\nuninitialized, and then a call to ext4_msg triggers the problem by\naccessing an uninitialized rs->lock. Therefore register sysfs after all\ninitializations are complete to avoid such problems.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/sched: act_api: fix possible infinite loop in tcf_idr_check_alloc()\n\nsyzbot found hanging tasks waiting on rtnl_lock [1]\n\nA reproducer is available in the syzbot bug.\n\nWhen a request to add multiple actions with the same index is sent, the\nsecond request will block forever on the first request. This holds\nrtnl_lock, and causes tasks to hang.\n\nReturn -EAGAIN to prevent infinite looping, while keeping documented\nbehavior.\n\n[1]\n\nINFO: task kworker/1:0:5088 blocked for more than 143 seconds.\nNot tainted 6.9.0-rc4-syzkaller-00173-g3cdb45594619 #0\n"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.\ntask:kworker/1:0 state:D stack:23744 pid:5088 tgid:5088 ppid:2 flags:0x00004000\nWorkqueue: events_power_efficient reg_check_chans_work\nCall Trace:\n<TASK>\ncontext_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5409 [inline]\n__schedule+0xf15/0x5d00 kernel/sched/core.c:6746\n__schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:6823 [inline]\nschedule+0xe7/0x350 kernel/sched/core.c:6838\nschedule_preempt_disabled+0x13/0x30 kernel/sched/core.c:6895\n__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:684 [inline]\n__mutex_lock+0x5b8/0x9c0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752\nwiphy_lock include/net/cfg80211.h:5953 [inline]\nreg_leave_invalid_chans net/wireless/reg.c:2466 [inline]\nreg_check_chans_work+0x10a/0x10e0 net/wireless/reg.c:2481

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: arm64: Disassociate vcpus from redistributor region on teardown\n\nWhen tearing down a redistributor region, make sure we don't have\nany dangling pointer to that region stored in a vcpu.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/radeon: fix UBSAN warning in kv_dpm.c\n\nAdds bounds check for sumo_vid_mapping_entry.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: qedi: Fix crash while reading debugfs attribute\n\nThe qedi_dbg_do_not_recover_cmd_read() function invokes sprintf() directly\non a __user pointer, which results into the crash.\n\nTo fix this issue, use a small local stack buffer for sprintf() and then\ncall simple_read_from_buffer(), which in turns make the copy_to_user()\ncall.\n\nBUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00007f4801111000\nPGD 8000000864df6067 P4D 8000000864df6067 PUD 864df7067 PMD 846028067 PTE 0\nOops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI\nHardware name: HPE ProLiant DL380 Gen10/ProLiant DL380 Gen10, BIOS U30 06/15/2023\nRIP: 0010:memcpy_orig+0xcd/0x130\nRSP: 0018:ffffb7a18c3ffc40 EFLAGS: 00010202\nRAX: 00007f4801111000 RBX: 00007f4801111000 RCX: 000000000000000f\nRDX: 000000000000000f RSI: ffffffffc0bfd7a0 RDI: 00007f4801111000\nRBP: ffffffffc0bfd7a0 R08: 725f746f6e5f6f64 R09: 3d7265766f636572\nR10: ffffb7a18c3ffd08 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00007f4881110fff\nR13: 000000007fffffff R14: ffffb7a18c3ffca0 R15: ffffffffc0bfd7af\nFS: 00007f480118a740(0000) GS:ffff98e38af00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 00007f4801111000 CR3: 0000000864b8e001 CR4: 00000000007706e0\nDR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\nDR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\nPKRU: 55555554\nCall Trace:\n <TASK>\n ? __die_body+0x1a/0x60\n ? page_fault_oops+0x183/0x510\n ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x150\n ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30\n ? memcpy_orig+0xcd/0x130\n vsnprintf+0x102/0x4c0\n sprintf+0x51/0x80\n qedi_dbg_do_not_recover_cmd_read+0x2f/0x50 [qedi 6bcfdeeecdea037da47069eca2ba717c84a77324]\n full_proxy_read+0x50/0x80\n vfs_read+0xa5/0x2e0\n ? folio_add_new_anon_rmap+0x44/0xa0\n ? set_pte_at+0x15/0x30\n ? do_pte_missing+0x426/0x7f0\n ksys_read+0xa5/0xe0\n do_syscall_64+0x58/0x80\n ? __count_memcg_events+0x46/0x90\n ? count_memcg_event_mm+0x3d/0x60\n ? handle_mm_fault+0x196/0x2f0\n ? do_user_addr_fault+0x267/0x890\n ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x150\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc\nRIP: 0033:0x7f4800f20b4d

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: mt76: mt7921s: fix potential hung tasks during chip recovery\n\nDuring chip recovery (e.g. chip reset), there is a possible situation that\nkernel worker reset_work is holding the lock and waiting for kernel thread\nstat_worker to be parked, while stat_worker is waiting for the release of\nthe same lock.\nIt causes a deadlock resulting in the dumping of hung tasks messages and\npossible rebooting of the device.\n\nThis patch prevents the execution of stat_worker during the chip recovery.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\next4: do not create EA inode under buffer lock\n\next4_xattr_set_entry() creates new EA inodes while holding buffer lock\non the external xattr block. This is problematic as it nests all the\nallocation locking (which acquires locks on other buffers) under the\nbuffer lock. This can even deadlock when the filesystem is corrupted and\ne.g. quota file is setup to contain xattr block as data block. Move the\nallocation of EA inode out of ext4_xattr_set_entry() into the callers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv6: prevent possible NULL dereference in rt6_probe()\n\nsyzbot caught a NULL dereference in rt6_probe() [1]\n\nBail out if __in6_dev_get() returns NULL.\n\n[1]\nOops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000000cb: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI\nKASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000658-0x000000000000065f]\nCPU: 1 PID: 22444 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00383-gb8481381d4e2 #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024\n RIP: 0010:rt6_probe net/ipv6/route.c:656 [inline]\n RIP: 0010:find_match+0x8c4/0xf50 net/ipv6/route.c:758\nCode: 14 fd f7 48 8b 85 38 ff ff ff 48 c7 45 b0 00 00 00 00 48 8d b8 5c 06 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 14 02 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 19\nRSP: 0018:ffffc900034af070 EFLAGS: 00010203\nRAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffc90004521000\nRDX: 00000000000000cb RSI: ffffffff8990d0cd RDI: 000000000000065c\nRBP: ffffc900034af150 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000\nR10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 000000000000000a\nR13: 1ffff92000695e18 R14: ffff8880244a1d20 R15: 0000000000000000\nFS: 00007f4844a5a6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 0000001b31b27000 CR3: 000000002d42c000 CR4: 00000000003506f0\nDR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\nDR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\nCall Trace:\n <TASK>\n rt6_nh_find_match+0xfa/0x1a0 net/ipv6/route.c:784\n nexthop_for_each_fib6_nh+0x26d/0x4a0 net/ipv4/nexthop.c:1496\n __find_rr_leaf+0x6e7/0xe00 net/ipv6/route.c:825\n find_rr_leaf net/ipv6/route.c:853 [inline]\n rt6_select net/ipv6/route.c:897 [inline]\n fib6_table_lookup+0x57e/0xa30 net/ipv6/route.c:2195\n ip6_pol_route+0x1cd/0x1150 net/ipv6/route.c:2231\n pol_lookup_func include/net/ip6_fib.h:616 [inline]\n fib6_rule_lookup+0x386/0x720 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:121\n ip6_route_output_flags_noref net/ipv6/route.c:2639 [inline]\n ip6_route_output_flags+0x1d0/0x640 net/ipv6/route.c:2651\n ip6_dst_lookup_tail.constprop.0+0x961/0x1760 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1147\n ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x99/0x1d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1250\n rawv6_sendmsg+0xdab/0x4340 net/ipv6/raw.c:898\n inet_sendmsg+0x119/0x140 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:853\n sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]\n __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]\n sock_write_iter+0x4b8/0x5c0 net/socket.c:1160\n new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline]\n vfs_write+0x6b6/0x1140 fs/read_write.c:590\n ksys_write+0x1f8/0x260 fs/read_write.c:643\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxfrm6: check ip6_dst_idev() return value in xfrm6_get_saddr()\n\nip6_dst_idev() can return NULL, xfrm6_get_saddr() must act accordingly.\n\nsyzbot reported:\n\nOops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI\nKASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]\nCPU: 1 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00383-gb8481381d4e2 #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024\nWorkqueue: wg-kex-wg1 wg_packet_handshake_send_worker\n RIP: 0010:xfrm6_get_saddr+0x93/0x130 net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c:64\nCode: df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 97 00 00 00 4c 8b ab d8 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 ea 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 86 00 00 00 4d 8b 6d 00 e8 ca 13 47 01 48 b8 00\nRSP: 0018:ffffc90000117378 EFLAGS: 00010246\nRAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88807b079dc0 RCX: ffffffff89a0d6d7\nRDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff89a0d6e9 RDI: ffff88807b079e98\nRBP: ffff88807ad73248 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: fffffffffffff000\nR10: ffff88807b079dc0 R11: 0000000000000007 R12: ffffc90000117480\nR13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000\nFS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 00007f4586d00440 CR3: 0000000079042000 CR4: 00000000003506f0\nDR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\nDR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\nCall Trace:\n <TASK>\n xfrm_get_saddr net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2452 [inline]\n xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2481 [inline]\n xfrm_tmpl_resolve+0xa26/0xf10 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2541\n xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle+0x140/0x2570 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2835\n xfrm_bundle_lookup net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3070 [inline]\n xfrm_lookup_with_ifid+0x4d1/0x1e60 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3201\n xfrm_lookup net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3298 [inline]\n xfrm_lookup_route+0x3b/0x200 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3309\n ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x15c/0x1d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1256\n send6+0x611/0xd20 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c:139\n wg_socket_send_skb_to_peer+0xf9/0x220 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c:178\n wg_socket_send_buffer_to_peer+0x12b/0x190 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c:200\n wg_packet_send_handshake_initiation+0x227/0x360 drivers/net/wireguard/send.c:40\n wg_packet_handshake_send_worker+0x1c/0x30 drivers/net/wireguard/send.c:51\n process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3231\n process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3312 [inline]\n worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf70 kernel/workqueue.c:3393\n kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389\n ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: iwlwifi: mvm: don't read past the mfuart notifcation\n\nIn case the firmware sends a notification that claims it has more data\nthan it has, we will read past that was allocated for the notification.\nRemove the print of the buffer, we won't see it by default. If needed,\nwe can see the content with tracing.\n\nThis was reported by KFENCE.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmptcp: ensure snd_una is properly initialized on connect\n\nThis is strictly related to commit fb7a0d334894 ("mptcp: ensure snd_nxt\nis properly initialized on connect"). It turns out that syzkaller can\ntrigger the retransmit after fallback and before processing any other\nincoming packet - so that snd_una is still left uninitialized.\n\nAddress the issue explicitly initializing snd_una together with snd_nxt\nand write_seq.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: iwlwifi: mvm: check n_ssids before accessing the ssids\n\nIn some versions of cfg80211, the ssids poinet might be a valid one even\nthough n_ssids is 0. Accessing the pointer in this case will cuase an\nout-of-bound access. Fix this by checking n_ssids first.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: mac80211: Fix deadlock in ieee80211_sta_ps_deliver_wakeup()\n\nThe ieee80211_sta_ps_deliver_wakeup() function takes sta->ps_lock to\nsynchronizes with ieee80211_tx_h_unicast_ps_buf() which is called from\nsoftirq context. However using only spin_lock() to get sta->ps_lock in\nieee80211_sta_ps_deliver_wakeup() does not prevent softirq to execute\non this same CPU, to run ieee80211_tx_h_unicast_ps_buf() and try to\ntake this same lock ending in deadlock. Below is an example of rcu stall\nthat arises in such situation.\n\n rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU\n rcu: 2-....: (42413413 ticks this GP) idle=b154/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=1763/1765 fqs=21206996\n rcu: (t=42586894 jiffies g=2057 q=362405 ncpus=4)\n CPU: 2 PID: 719 Comm: wpa_supplicant Tainted: G W 6.4.0-02158-g1b062f552873 #742\n Hardware name: RPT (r1) (DT)\n pstate: 00000005 (nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\n pc : queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x58/0x2d0\n lr : invoke_tx_handlers_early+0x5b4/0x5c0\n sp : ffff00001ef64660\n x29: ffff00001ef64660 x28: ffff000009bc1070 x27: ffff000009bc0ad8\n x26: ffff000009bc0900 x25: ffff00001ef647a8 x24: 0000000000000000\n x23: ffff000009bc0900 x22: ffff000009bc0900 x21: ffff00000ac0e000\n x20: ffff00000a279e00 x19: ffff00001ef646e8 x18: 0000000000000000\n x17: ffff800016468000 x16: ffff00001ef608c0 x15: 0010533c93f64f80\n x14: 0010395c9faa3946 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 00000000fa83b2da\n x11: 000000012edeceea x10: ffff0000010fbe00 x9 : 0000000000895440\n x8 : 000000000010533c x7 : ffff00000ad8b740 x6 : ffff00000c350880\n x5 : 0000000000000007 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : 0000000000000000\n x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : ffff00000ac0e0e8\n Call trace:\n queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x58/0x2d0\n ieee80211_tx+0x80/0x12c\n ieee80211_tx_pending+0x110/0x278\n tasklet_action_common.constprop.0+0x10c/0x144\n tasklet_action+0x20/0x28\n _stext+0x11c/0x284\n ____do_softirq+0xc/0x14\n call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x34\n do_softirq_own_stack+0x18/0x20\n do_softirq+0x74/0x7c\n __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa0/0xa4\n _ieee80211_wake_txqs+0x3b0/0x4b8\n __ieee80211_wake_queue+0x12c/0x168\n ieee80211_add_pending_skbs+0xec/0x138\n ieee80211_sta_ps_deliver_wakeup+0x2a4/0x480\n ieee80211_mps_sta_status_update.part.0+0xd8/0x11c\n ieee80211_mps_sta_status_update+0x18/0x24\n sta_apply_parameters+0x3bc/0x4c0\n ieee80211_change_station+0x1b8/0x2dc\n nl80211_set_station+0x444/0x49c\n genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0xa4/0xfc\n genl_rcv_msg+0x1b0/0x244\n netlink_rcv_skb+0x38/0x10c\n genl_rcv+0x34/0x48\n netlink_unicast+0x254/0x2bc\n netlink_sendmsg+0x190/0x3b4\n ____sys_sendmsg+0x1e8/0x218\n ___sys_sendmsg+0x68/0x8c\n __sys_sendmsg+0x44/0x84\n __arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x20/0x28\n do_el0_svc+0x6c/0xe8\n el0_svc+0x14/0x48\n el0t_64_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb4\n el0t_64_sync+0x14c/0x150\n\nUsing spin_lock_bh()/spin_unlock_bh() instead prevents softirq to raise\non the same CPU that is holding the lock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: cfg80211: Lock wiphy in cfg80211_get_station\n\nWiphy should be locked before calling rdev_get_station() (see lockdep\nassert in ieee80211_get_station()).\n\nThis fixes the following kernel NULL dereference:\n\n Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000050\n Mem abort info:\n ESR = 0x0000000096000006\n EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits\n SET = 0, FnV = 0\n EA = 0, S1PTW = 0\n FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault\n Data abort info:\n ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006\n CM = 0, WnR = 0\n user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000003001000\n [0000000000000050] pgd=0800000002dca003, p4d=0800000002dca003, pud=08000000028e9003, pmd=0000000000000000\n Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000006 [#1] SMP\n Modules linked in: netconsole dwc3_meson_g12a dwc3_of_simple dwc3 ip_gre gre ath10k_pci ath10k_core ath9k ath9k_common ath9k_hw ath\n CPU: 0 PID: 1091 Comm: kworker/u8:0 Not tainted 6.4.0-02144-g565f9a3a7911-dirty #705\n Hardware name: RPT (r1) (DT)\n Workqueue: bat_events batadv_v_elp_throughput_metric_update\n pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\n pc : ath10k_sta_statistics+0x10/0x2dc [ath10k_core]\n lr : sta_set_sinfo+0xcc/0xbd4\n sp : ffff000007b43ad0\n x29: ffff000007b43ad0 x28: ffff0000071fa900 x27: ffff00000294ca98\n x26: ffff000006830880 x25: ffff000006830880 x24: ffff00000294c000\n x23: 0000000000000001 x22: ffff000007b43c90 x21: ffff800008898acc\n x20: ffff00000294c6e8 x19: ffff000007b43c90 x18: 0000000000000000\n x17: 445946354d552d78 x16: 62661f7200000000 x15: 57464f445946354d\n x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 00000000000000e3 x12: d5f0acbcebea978e\n x11: 00000000000000e3 x10: 000000010048fe41 x9 : 0000000000000000\n x8 : ffff000007b43d90 x7 : 000000007a1e2125 x6 : 0000000000000000\n x5 : ffff0000024e0900 x4 : ffff800000a0250c x3 : ffff000007b43c90\n x2 : ffff00000294ca98 x1 : ffff000006831920 x0 : 0000000000000000\n Call trace:\n ath10k_sta_statistics+0x10/0x2dc [ath10k_core]\n sta_set_sinfo+0xcc/0xbd4\n ieee80211_get_station+0x2c/0x44\n cfg80211_get_station+0x80/0x154\n batadv_v_elp_get_throughput+0x138/0x1fc\n batadv_v_elp_throughput_metric_update+0x1c/0xa4\n process_one_work+0x1ec/0x414\n worker_thread+0x70/0x46c\n kthread+0xdc/0xe0\n ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20\n Code: a9bb7bfd 910003fd a90153f3 f9411c40 (f9402814)\n\nThis happens because STA has time to disconnect and reconnect before\nbatadv_v_elp_throughput_metric_update() delayed work gets scheduled. In\nthis situation, ath10k_sta_state() can be in the middle of resetting\narsta data when the work queue get chance to be scheduled and ends up\naccessing it. Locking wiphy prevents that.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nUSB: class: cdc-wdm: Fix CPU lockup caused by excessive log messages\n\nThe syzbot fuzzer found that the interrupt-URB completion callback in\nthe cdc-wdm driver was taking too long, and the driver's immediate\nresubmission of interrupt URBs with -EPROTO status combined with the\ndummy-hcd emulation to cause a CPU lockup:\n\ncdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: nonzero urb status received: -71\ncdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: wdm_int_callback - 0 bytes\nwatchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [syz-executor782:6625]\nCPU#0 Utilization every 4s during lockup:\n #1: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle\n #2: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle\n #3: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle\n #4: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle\n #5: 98% system, 1% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle\nModules linked in:\nirq event stamp: 73096\nhardirqs last enabled at (73095): [<ffff80008037bc00>] console_emit_next_record kernel/printk/printk.c:2935 [inline]\nhardirqs last enabled at (73095): [<ffff80008037bc00>] console_flush_all+0x650/0xb74 kernel/printk/printk.c:2994\nhardirqs last disabled at (73096): [<ffff80008af10b00>] __el1_irq arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:533 [inline]\nhardirqs last disabled at (73096): [<ffff80008af10b00>] el1_interrupt+0x24/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:551\nsoftirqs last enabled at (73048): [<ffff8000801ea530>] softirq_handle_end kernel/softirq.c:400 [inline]\nsoftirqs last enabled at (73048): [<ffff8000801ea530>] handle_softirqs+0xa60/0xc34 kernel/softirq.c:582\nsoftirqs last disabled at (73043): [<ffff800080020de8>] __do_softirq+0x14/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:588\nCPU: 0 PID: 6625 Comm: syz-executor782 Tainted: G W 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-g8867bbd4a056 #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024\n\nTesting showed that the problem did not occur if the two error\nmessages -- the first two lines above -- were removed; apparently adding\nmaterial to the kernel log takes a surprisingly large amount of time.\n\nIn any case, the best approach for preventing these lockups and to\navoid spamming the log with thousands of error messages per second is\nto ratelimit the two dev_err() calls. Therefore we replace them with\ndev_err_ratelimited().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: mpt3sas: Avoid test/set_bit() operating in non-allocated memory\n\nThere is a potential out-of-bounds access when using test_bit() on a single\nword. The test_bit() and set_bit() functions operate on long values, and\nwhen testing or setting a single word, they can exceed the word\nboundary. KASAN detects this issue and produces a dump:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _scsih_add_device.constprop.0 (./arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:60 ./include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-atomic.h:29 drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c:7331) mpt3sas\n\n Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881d26e3c60 by task kworker/u1536:2/2965\n\nFor full log, please look at [1].\n\nMake the allocation at least the size of sizeof(unsigned long) so that\nset_bit() and test_bit() have sufficient room for read/write operations\nwithout overwriting unallocated memory.\n\n[1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZkNcALr3W3KGYYJG@gmail.com/

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nliquidio: Adjust a NULL pointer handling path in lio_vf_rep_copy_packet\n\nIn lio_vf_rep_copy_packet() pg_info->page is compared to a NULL value,\nbut then it is unconditionally passed to skb_add_rx_frag() which looks\nstrange and could lead to null pointer dereference.\n\nlio_vf_rep_copy_packet() call trace looks like:\n octeon_droq_process_packets\n octeon_droq_fast_process_packets\n octeon_droq_dispatch_pkt\n octeon_create_recv_info\n ...search in the dispatch_list...\n ->disp_fn(rdisp->rinfo, ...)\n lio_vf_rep_pkt_recv(struct octeon_recv_info *recv_info, ...)\nIn this path there is no code which sets pg_info->page to NULL.\nSo this check looks unneeded and doesn't solve potential problem.\nBut I guess the author had reason to add a check and I have no such card\nand can't do real test.\nIn addition, the code in the function liquidio_push_packet() in\nliquidio/lio_core.c does exactly the same.\n\nBased on this, I consider the most acceptable compromise solution to\nadjust this issue by moving skb_add_rx_frag() into conditional scope.\n\nFound by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrivers: core: synchronize really_probe() and dev_uevent()\n\nSynchronize the dev->driver usage in really_probe() and dev_uevent().\nThese can run in different threads, what can result in the following\nrace condition for dev->driver uninitialization:\n\nThread #1:\n==========\n\nreally_probe() {\n...\nprobe_failed:\n...\ndevice_unbind_cleanup(dev) {\n ...\n dev->driver = NULL; // <= Failed probe sets dev->driver to NULL\n ...\n }\n...\n}\n\nThread #2:\n==========\n\ndev_uevent() {\n...\nif (dev->driver)\n // If dev->driver is NULLed from really_probe() from here on,\n // after above check, the system crashes\n add_uevent_var(env, "DRIVER=%s", dev->driver->name);\n...\n}\n\nreally_probe() holds the lock, already. So nothing needs to be done\nthere. dev_uevent() is called with lock held, often, too. But not\nalways. What implies that we can't add any locking in dev_uevent()\nitself. So fix this race by adding the lock to the non-protected\npath. This is the path where above race is observed:\n\n dev_uevent+0x235/0x380\n uevent_show+0x10c/0x1f0 <= Add lock here\n dev_attr_show+0x3a/0xa0\n sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x17c/0x250\n kernfs_seq_show+0x7c/0x90\n seq_read_iter+0x2d7/0x940\n kernfs_fop_read_iter+0xc6/0x310\n vfs_read+0x5bc/0x6b0\n ksys_read+0xeb/0x1b0\n __x64_sys_read+0x42/0x50\n x64_sys_call+0x27ad/0x2d30\n do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x1d0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n\nSimilar cases are reported by syzkaller in\n\nhttps://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ffa8143439596313a85a\n\nBut these are regarding the *initialization* of dev->driver\n\ndev->driver = drv;\n\nAs this switches dev->driver to non-NULL these reports can be considered\nto be false-positives (which should be "fixed" by this commit, as well,\nthough).\n\nThe same issue was reported and tried to be fixed back in 2015 in\n\nhttps://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1421259054-2574-1-git-send-email-a.sangwan@samsung.com/\n\nalready.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amdgpu: add error handle to avoid out-of-bounds\n\nif the sdma_v4_0_irq_id_to_seq return -EINVAL, the process should\nbe stop to avoid out-of-bounds read, so directly return -EINVAL.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb-storage: alauda: Check whether the media is initialized\n\nThe member "uzonesize" of struct alauda_info will remain 0\nif alauda_init_media() fails, potentially causing divide errors\nin alauda_read_data() and alauda_write_lba().\n- Add a member "media_initialized" to struct alauda_info.\n- Change a condition in alauda_check_media() to ensure the\n first initialization.\n- Add an error check for the return value of alauda_init_media().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amdgpu/mes: fix use-after-free issue\n\nDelete fence fallback timer to fix the ramdom\nuse-after-free issue.\n\nv2: move to amdgpu_mes.c

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: bcm - Fix pointer arithmetic\n\nIn spu2_dump_omd() value of ptr is increased by ciph_key_len\ninstead of hash_iv_len which could lead to going beyond the\nbuffer boundaries.\nFix this bug by changing ciph_key_len to hash_iv_len.\n\nFound by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ngfs2: Fix potential glock use-after-free on unmount\n\nWhen a DLM lockspace is released and there ares still locks in that\nlockspace, DLM will unlock those locks automatically. Commit\nfb6791d100d1b started exploiting this behavior to speed up filesystem\nunmount: gfs2 would simply free glocks it didn't want to unlock and then\nrelease the lockspace. This didn't take the bast callbacks for\nasynchronous lock contention notifications into account, which remain\nactive until until a lock is unlocked or its lockspace is released.\n\nTo prevent those callbacks from accessing deallocated objects, put the\nglocks that should not be unlocked on the sd_dead_glocks list, release\nthe lockspace, and only then free those glocks.\n\nAs an additional measure, ignore unexpected ast and bast callbacks if\nthe receiving glock is dead.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: qedf: Ensure the copied buf is NUL terminated\n\nCurrently, we allocate a count-sized kernel buffer and copy count from\nuserspace to that buffer. Later, we use kstrtouint on this buffer but we\ndon't ensure that the string is terminated inside the buffer, this can\nlead to OOB read when using kstrtouint. Fix this issue by using\nmemdup_user_nul instead of memdup_user.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: openvswitch: fix overwriting ct original tuple for ICMPv6\n\nOVS_PACKET_CMD_EXECUTE has 3 main attributes:\n - OVS_PACKET_ATTR_KEY - Packet metadata in a netlink format.\n - OVS_PACKET_ATTR_PACKET - Binary packet content.\n - OVS_PACKET_ATTR_ACTIONS - Actions to execute on the packet.\n\nOVS_PACKET_ATTR_KEY is parsed first to populate sw_flow_key structure\nwith the metadata like conntrack state, input port, recirculation id,\netc. Then the packet itself gets parsed to populate the rest of the\nkeys from the packet headers.\n\nWhenever the packet parsing code starts parsing the ICMPv6 header, it\nfirst zeroes out fields in the key corresponding to Neighbor Discovery\ninformation even if it is not an ND packet.\n\nIt is an 'ipv6.nd' field. However, the 'ipv6' is a union that shares\nthe space between 'nd' and 'ct_orig' that holds the original tuple\nconntrack metadata parsed from the OVS_PACKET_ATTR_KEY.\n\nND packets should not normally have conntrack state, so it's fine to\nshare the space, but normal ICMPv6 Echo packets or maybe other types of\nICMPv6 can have the state attached and it should not be overwritten.\n\nThe issue results in all but the last 4 bytes of the destination\naddress being wiped from the original conntrack tuple leading to\nincorrect packet matching and potentially executing wrong actions\nin case this packet recirculates within the datapath or goes back\nto userspace.\n\nND fields should not be accessed in non-ND packets, so not clearing\nthem should be fine. Executing memset() only for actual ND packets to\navoid the issue.\n\nInitializing the whole thing before parsing is needed because ND packet\nmay not contain all the options.\n\nThe issue only affects the OVS_PACKET_CMD_EXECUTE path and doesn't\naffect packets entering OVS datapath from network interfaces, because\nin this case CT metadata is populated from skb after the packet is\nalready parsed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntcp: Fix shift-out-of-bounds in dctcp_update_alpha().\n\nIn dctcp_update_alpha(), we use a module parameter dctcp_shift_g\nas follows:\n\n alpha -= min_not_zero(alpha, alpha >> dctcp_shift_g);\n ...\n delivered_ce <<= (10 - dctcp_shift_g);\n\nIt seems syzkaller started fuzzing module parameters and triggered\nshift-out-of-bounds [0] by setting 100 to dctcp_shift_g:\n\n memcpy((void*)0x20000080,\n "/sys/module/tcp_dctcp/parameters/dctcp_shift_g\\000", 47);\n res = syscall(__NR_openat, /*fd=*/0xffffffffffffff9cul, /*file=*/0x20000080ul,\n /*flags=*/2ul, /*mode=*/0ul);\n memcpy((void*)0x20000000, "100\\000", 4);\n syscall(__NR_write, /*fd=*/r[0], /*val=*/0x20000000ul, /*len=*/4ul);\n\nLet's limit the max value of dctcp_shift_g by param_set_uint_minmax().\n\nWith this patch:\n\n # echo 10 > /sys/module/tcp_dctcp/parameters/dctcp_shift_g\n # cat /sys/module/tcp_dctcp/parameters/dctcp_shift_g\n 10\n # echo 11 > /sys/module/tcp_dctcp/parameters/dctcp_shift_g\n -bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument\n\n[0]:\nUBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c:143:12\nshift exponent 100 is too large for 32-bit type 'u32' (aka 'unsigned int')\nCPU: 0 PID: 8083 Comm: syz-executor345 Not tainted 6.9.0-05151-g1b294a1f3561 #2\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS\n1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014\nCall Trace:\n <TASK>\n __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]\n dump_stack_lvl+0x201/0x300 lib/dump_stack.c:114\n ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:231 [inline]\n __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x346/0x3a0 lib/ubsan.c:468\n dctcp_update_alpha+0x540/0x570 net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c:143\n tcp_in_ack_event net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3802 [inline]\n tcp_ack+0x17b1/0x3bc0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3948\n tcp_rcv_state_process+0x57a/0x2290 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6711\n tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x764/0xc40 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1937\n sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:1106 [inline]\n __release_sock+0x20f/0x350 net/core/sock.c:2983\n release_sock+0x61/0x1f0 net/core/sock.c:3549\n mptcp_subflow_shutdown+0x3d0/0x620 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2907\n mptcp_check_send_data_fin+0x225/0x410 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2976\n __mptcp_close+0x238/0xad0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3072\n mptcp_close+0x2a/0x1a0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3127\n inet_release+0x190/0x1f0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:437\n __sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline]\n sock_close+0xc0/0x240 net/socket.c:1421\n __fput+0x41b/0x890 fs/file_table.c:422\n task_work_run+0x23b/0x300 kernel/task_work.c:180\n exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]\n do_exit+0x9c8/0x2540 kernel/exit.c:878\n do_group_exit+0x201/0x2b0 kernel/exit.c:1027\n __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1038 [inline]\n __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1036 [inline]\n __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1036\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0xe4/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0x6f\nRIP: 0033:0x7f6c2b5005b6\nCode: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f6c2b50058c.\nRSP: 002b:00007ffe883eb948 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7\nRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f6c2b5862f0 RCX: 00007f6c2b5005b6\nRDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 000000000000003c RDI: 0000000000000001\nRBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 00000000000000e7 R09: ffffffffffffffc0\nR10: 0000000000000006 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f6c2b5862f0\nR13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001\n </TASK>

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: arm64: vgic-v2: Check for non-NULL vCPU in vgic_v2_parse_attr()\n\nvgic_v2_parse_attr() is responsible for finding the vCPU that matches\nthe user-provided CPUID, which (of course) may not be valid. If the ID\nis invalid, kvm_get_vcpu_by_id() returns NULL, which isn't handled\ngracefully.\n\nSimilar to the GICv3 uaccess flow, check that kvm_get_vcpu_by_id()\nactually returns something and fail the ioctl if not.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnfs: Handle error of rpc_proc_register() in nfs_net_init().\n\nsyzkaller reported a warning [0] triggered while destroying immature\nnetns.\n\nrpc_proc_register() was called in init_nfs_fs(), but its error\nhas been ignored since at least the initial commit 1da177e4c3f4\n("Linux-2.6.12-rc2").\n\nRecently, commit d47151b79e32 ("nfs: expose /proc/net/sunrpc/nfs\nin net namespaces") converted the procfs to per-netns and made\nthe problem more visible.\n\nEven when rpc_proc_register() fails, nfs_net_init() could succeed,\nand thus nfs_net_exit() will be called while destroying the netns.\n\nThen, remove_proc_entry() will be called for non-existing proc\ndirectory and trigger the warning below.\n\nLet's handle the error of rpc_proc_register() properly in nfs_net_init().\n\n[0]:\nname 'nfs'\nWARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1710 at fs/proc/generic.c:711 remove_proc_entry+0x1bb/0x2d0 fs/proc/generic.c:711\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 1 PID: 1710 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.8.0-12822-gcd51db110a7e #12\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:remove_proc_entry+0x1bb/0x2d0 fs/proc/generic.c:711\nCode: 41 5d 41 5e c3 e8 85 09 b5 ff 48 c7 c7 88 58 64 86 e8 09 0e 71 02 e8 74 09 b5 ff 4c 89 e6 48 c7 c7 de 1b 80 84 e8 c5 ad 97 ff <0f> 0b eb b1 e8 5c 09 b5 ff 48 c7 c7 88 58 64 86 e8 e0 0d 71 02 eb\nRSP: 0018:ffffc9000c6d7ce0 EFLAGS: 00010286\nRAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8880422b8b00 RCX: ffffffff8110503c\nRDX: ffff888030652f00 RSI: ffffffff81105045 RDI: 0000000000000001\nRBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000\nR10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffffff81bb62cb R12: ffffffff84807ffc\nR13: ffff88804ad6fcc0 R14: ffffffff84807ffc R15: ffffffff85741ff8\nFS: 00007f30cfba8640(0000) GS:ffff88807dd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 00007ff51afe8000 CR3: 000000005a60a005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0\nDR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\nDR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\nPKRU: 55555554\nCall Trace:\n <TASK>\n rpc_proc_unregister+0x64/0x70 net/sunrpc/stats.c:310\n nfs_net_exit+0x1c/0x30 fs/nfs/inode.c:2438\n ops_exit_list+0x62/0xb0 net/core/net_namespace.c:170\n setup_net+0x46c/0x660 net/core/net_namespace.c:372\n copy_net_ns+0x244/0x590 net/core/net_namespace.c:505\n create_new_namespaces+0x2ed/0x770 kernel/nsproxy.c:110\n unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xae/0x160 kernel/nsproxy.c:228\n ksys_unshare+0x342/0x760 kernel/fork.c:3322\n __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3393 [inline]\n __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3391 [inline]\n __x64_sys_unshare+0x1f/0x30 kernel/fork.c:3391\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e\nRIP: 0033:0x7f30d0febe5d\nCode: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 73 9f 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48\nRSP: 002b:00007f30cfba7cc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000110\nRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004bbf80 RCX: 00007f30d0febe5d\nRDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000006c020600\nRBP: 00000000004bbf80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000\nR10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002\nR13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f30d104c530 R15: 0000000000000000\n </TASK>

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: iwlwifi: read txq->read_ptr under lock\n\nIf we read txq->read_ptr without lock, we can read the same\nvalue twice, then obtain the lock, and reclaim from there\nto two different places, but crucially reclaim the same\nentry twice, resulting in the WARN_ONCE() a little later.\nFix that by reading txq->read_ptr under lock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: mpi3mr: Avoid memcpy field-spanning write WARNING\n\nWhen the "storcli2 show" command is executed for eHBA-9600, mpi3mr driver\nprints this WARNING message:\n\n memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 128) of single field "bsg_reply_buf->reply_buf" at drivers/scsi/mpi3mr/mpi3mr_app.c:1658 (size 1)\n WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 12760 at drivers/scsi/mpi3mr/mpi3mr_app.c:1658 mpi3mr_bsg_request+0x6b12/0x7f10 [mpi3mr]\n\nThe cause of the WARN is 128 bytes memcpy to the 1 byte size array "__u8\nreplay_buf[1]" in the struct mpi3mr_bsg_in_reply_buf. The array is intended\nto be a flexible length array, so the WARN is a false positive.\n\nTo suppress the WARN, remove the constant number '1' from the array\ndeclaration and clarify that it has flexible length. Also, adjust the\nmemory allocation size to match the change.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: bnx2fc: Remove spin_lock_bh while releasing resources after upload\n\nThe session resources are used by FW and driver when session is offloaded,\nonce session is uploaded these resources are not used. The lock is not\nrequired as these fields won't be used any longer. The offload and upload\ncalls are sequential, hence lock is not required.\n\nThis will suppress following BUG_ON():\n\n[ 449.843143] ------------[ cut here ]------------\n[ 449.848302] kernel BUG at mm/vmalloc.c:2727!\n[ 449.853072] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI\n[ 449.858712] CPU: 5 PID: 1996 Comm: kworker/u24:2 Not tainted 5.14.0-118.el9.x86_64 #1\nRebooting.\n[ 449.867454] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/0WCJNT, BIOS 2.3.4 11/08/2016\n[ 449.876966] Workqueue: fc_rport_eq fc_rport_work [libfc]\n[ 449.882910] RIP: 0010:vunmap+0x2e/0x30\n[ 449.887098] Code: 00 65 8b 05 14 a2 f0 4a a9 00 ff ff 00 75 1b 55 48 89 fd e8 34 36 79 00 48 85 ed 74 0b 48 89 ef 31 f6 5d e9 14 fc ff ff 5d c3 <0f> 0b 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 56 49 89 ce 41 55 49 89 fd 41 54 41\n[ 449.908054] RSP: 0018:ffffb83d878b3d68 EFLAGS: 00010206\n[ 449.913887] RAX: 0000000080000201 RBX: ffff8f4355133550 RCX: 000000000d400005\n[ 449.921843] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000001000 RDI: ffffb83da53f5000\n[ 449.929808] RBP: ffff8f4ac6675800 R08: ffffb83d878b3d30 R09: 00000000000efbdf\n[ 449.937774] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffff8f434573e000 R12: 0000000000001000\n[ 449.945736] R13: 0000000000001000 R14: ffffb83da53f5000 R15: ffff8f43d4ea3ae0\n[ 449.953701] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8f529fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n[ 449.962732] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n[ 449.969138] CR2: 00007f8cf993e150 CR3: 0000000efbe10003 CR4: 00000000003706e0\n[ 449.977102] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\n[ 449.985065] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\n[ 449.993028] Call Trace:\n[ 449.995756] __iommu_dma_free+0x96/0x100\n[ 450.000139] bnx2fc_free_session_resc+0x67/0x240 [bnx2fc]\n[ 450.006171] bnx2fc_upload_session+0xce/0x100 [bnx2fc]\n[ 450.011910] bnx2fc_rport_event_handler+0x9f/0x240 [bnx2fc]\n[ 450.018136] fc_rport_work+0x103/0x5b0 [libfc]\n[ 450.023103] process_one_work+0x1e8/0x3c0\n[ 450.027581] worker_thread+0x50/0x3b0\n[ 450.031669] ? rescuer_thread+0x370/0x370\n[ 450.036143] kthread+0x149/0x170\n[ 450.039744] ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40\n[ 450.044411] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30\n[ 450.048404] Modules linked in: vfat msdos fat xfs nfs_layout_nfsv41_files rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver dm_service_time qedf qed crc8 bnx2fc libfcoe libfc scsi_transport_fc intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp dcdbas rapl intel_cstate intel_uncore mei_me pcspkr mei ipmi_ssif lpc_ich ipmi_si fuse zram ext4 mbcache jbd2 loop nfsv3 nfs_acl nfs lockd grace fscache netfs irdma ice sd_mod t10_pi sg ib_uverbs ib_core 8021q garp mrp stp llc mgag200 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt mxm_wmi fb_sys_fops cec crct10dif_pclmul ahci crc32_pclmul bnx2x drm ghash_clmulni_intel libahci rfkill i40e libata megaraid_sas mdio wmi sunrpc lrw dm_crypt dm_round_robin dm_multipath dm_snapshot dm_bufio dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_zero dm_mod linear raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx raid6_pq libcrc32c crc32c_intel raid1 raid0 iscsi_ibft squashfs be2iscsi bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i cxgb4 tls\n[ 450.048497] libcxgbi libcxgb qla4xxx iscsi_boot_sysfs iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi edd ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler\n[ 450.159753] ---[ end trace 712de2c57c64abc8 ]---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv6: fib6_rules: avoid possible NULL dereference in fib6_rule_action()\n\nsyzbot is able to trigger the following crash [1],\ncaused by unsafe ip6_dst_idev() use.\n\nIndeed ip6_dst_idev() can return NULL, and must always be checked.\n\n[1]\n\nOops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI\nKASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]\nCPU: 0 PID: 31648 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-next-20240417-syzkaller #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024\n RIP: 0010:__fib6_rule_action net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:237 [inline]\n RIP: 0010:fib6_rule_action+0x241/0x7b0 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:267\nCode: 02 00 00 49 8d 9f d8 00 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 20 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 f9 32 bf f7 48 8b 1b 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 20 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 e0 32 bf f7 4c 8b 03 48 89 ef 4c\nRSP: 0018:ffffc9000fc1f2f0 EFLAGS: 00010246\nRAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 1a772f98c8186700\nRDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: ffffffff8bcac4e0 RDI: ffffffff8c1f9760\nRBP: ffff8880673fb980 R08: ffffffff8fac15ef R09: 1ffffffff1f582bd\nR10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1f582be R12: dffffc0000000000\nR13: 0000000000000080 R14: ffff888076509000 R15: ffff88807a029a00\nFS: 00007f55e82ca6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 0000001b31d23000 CR3: 0000000022b66000 CR4: 00000000003506f0\nDR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\nDR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\nCall Trace:\n <TASK>\n fib_rules_lookup+0x62c/0xdb0 net/core/fib_rules.c:317\n fib6_rule_lookup+0x1fd/0x790 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:108\n ip6_route_output_flags_noref net/ipv6/route.c:2637 [inline]\n ip6_route_output_flags+0x38e/0x610 net/ipv6/route.c:2649\n ip6_route_output include/net/ip6_route.h:93 [inline]\n ip6_dst_lookup_tail+0x189/0x11a0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1120\n ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0xb9/0x180 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1250\n sctp_v6_get_dst+0x792/0x1e20 net/sctp/ipv6.c:326\n sctp_transport_route+0x12c/0x2e0 net/sctp/transport.c:455\n sctp_assoc_add_peer+0x614/0x15c0 net/sctp/associola.c:662\n sctp_connect_new_asoc+0x31d/0x6c0 net/sctp/socket.c:1099\n __sctp_connect+0x66d/0xe30 net/sctp/socket.c:1197\n sctp_connect net/sctp/socket.c:4819 [inline]\n sctp_inet_connect+0x149/0x1f0 net/sctp/socket.c:4834\n __sys_connect_file net/socket.c:2048 [inline]\n __sys_connect+0x2df/0x310 net/socket.c:2065\n __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2075 [inline]\n __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2072 [inline]\n __x64_sys_connect+0x7a/0x90 net/socket.c:2072\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv6: prevent NULL dereference in ip6_output()\n\nAccording to syzbot, there is a chance that ip6_dst_idev()\nreturns NULL in ip6_output(). Most places in IPv6 stack\ndeal with a NULL idev just fine, but not here.\n\nsyzbot reported:\n\ngeneral protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000000bc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI\nKASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000005e0-0x00000000000005e7]\nCPU: 0 PID: 9775 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00157-g6a30653b604a #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024\n RIP: 0010:ip6_output+0x231/0x3f0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:237\nCode: 3c 1e 00 49 89 df 74 08 4c 89 ef e8 19 58 db f7 48 8b 44 24 20 49 89 45 00 49 89 c5 48 8d 9d e0 05 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 38 84 c0 4c 8b 74 24 28 0f 85 61 01 00 00 8b 1b 31 ff\nRSP: 0018:ffffc9000927f0d8 EFLAGS: 00010202\nRAX: 00000000000000bc RBX: 00000000000005e0 RCX: 0000000000040000\nRDX: ffffc900131f9000 RSI: 0000000000004f47 RDI: 0000000000004f48\nRBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff8a1f0b9a R09: 1ffffffff1f51fad\nR10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1f51fae R12: ffff8880293ec8c0\nR13: ffff88805d7fc000 R14: 1ffff1100527d91a R15: dffffc0000000000\nFS: 00007f135c6856c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 0000000020000080 CR3: 0000000064096000 CR4: 00000000003506f0\nDR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\nDR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\nCall Trace:\n <TASK>\n NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]\n ip6_xmit+0xefe/0x17f0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:358\n sctp_v6_xmit+0x9f2/0x13f0 net/sctp/ipv6.c:248\n sctp_packet_transmit+0x26ad/0x2ca0 net/sctp/output.c:653\n sctp_packet_singleton+0x22c/0x320 net/sctp/outqueue.c:783\n sctp_outq_flush_ctrl net/sctp/outqueue.c:914 [inline]\n sctp_outq_flush+0x6d5/0x3e20 net/sctp/outqueue.c:1212\n sctp_side_effects net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1198 [inline]\n sctp_do_sm+0x59cc/0x60c0 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1169\n sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE+0x95/0xc0 net/sctp/primitive.c:73\n __sctp_connect+0x9cd/0xe30 net/sctp/socket.c:1234\n sctp_connect net/sctp/socket.c:4819 [inline]\n sctp_inet_connect+0x149/0x1f0 net/sctp/socket.c:4834\n __sys_connect_file net/socket.c:2048 [inline]\n __sys_connect+0x2df/0x310 net/socket.c:2065\n __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2075 [inline]\n __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2072 [inline]\n __x64_sys_connect+0x7a/0x90 net/socket.c:2072\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f